Masters and Commanders: How Four Titans Won the War in the West, 1941-1945

• Publisher:   Harper
• Number Of Pages:   720
• Publication Date:   2009-05-01
• ISBN-10 / ASIN:   0061228575
• ISBN-13 / EAN:   9780061228575

An epic joint biography, Masters and Commanders explores the degree to which the course of the Second World War turned on the relationships and temperaments of four of the strongest personalities of the twentieth century: political masters Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt and the commanders of their armed forces, General Sir Alan Brooke and General George C. Marshall. Each was exceptionally tough willed and strong minded, and each was certain that he knew best how to win the war. Yet each knew that he had to win at least two of the others if he was to have his strategy adopted. Andrew Roberts, whom The Economist calls "Britain's finest contemporary military historian," traces the mutual suspicion and admiration, the rebuffs and the charm, the often-explosive disagreements and wary reconciliations, and he helps us to appreciate the motives and imperatives acting upon these key leaders struggling to destroy Nazism.

Drawing on newly discovered verbatim accounts of Churchill's war-cabinet meetings and on the private papers of nearly seventy contemporaries, Roberts reconstructs the lively debates of the four principals and other leading figures, and attempts to answer some of the key questions of Allied strategy. Why, when the most direct route from Germany to Britain was through north-western France, did the Western Allies launch attacks via North Africa, Sicily, and Rome? Why, if Operation Overlord in June 1944 was intended to be the start of the Allies' great thrust into Germany, did four hundred thousand men land five hundred miles to the south, in southern France, two months later? Why did the Allies not take Berlin, Vienna, or Prague and allow the Iron Curtain to descend where it did?

Masters and Commanders dramatically re-creates the atmosphere, debates, and maneuverings through which Allied grand strategy was forged and reveals the profound impact of personality upon history.

After studying WW II over the last 30 years, I must admit that I agree with most of Robert's conclusions about the strategic controversies that arose during the war. However, I have come to the unpopular conclusion that the British were able to survive WW II in spite of Churchill and not because of him. He certainly wasn't a genius, anymore than Brooke was a strategic wonder boy. Moreover, the book was way too long for the redundant information that he was offering us. Also, I was very disappointed that the scope of his book was so narrow. The professional and personal conflicts between Ike, Monty, Patton, Bradley, De Gaulle, and the other commanders were very much a part of their deliberations with their own staffs, along with the estimates of Hitler's intentions. Anyway, it was an excellent book, but somewhat disappointing in its scope.

So few Americans and perhaps even fewer Britons understand the state of the democracies in 1939 when Germany launched what became World War II in Europe. Poland fell in a matter of weeks. Then the Lowlands and Norway. Then it was France's turn. In a matter of weeks, the glorious French were reduced to a German vassalage. Only Britain remained of the European democracies - and things didn't look too hopeful with the United States still officially a non-belligerent. This huge (720 pages) and slow-reading history focuses on the relationships of four men. The political masters: President Franklin Delano Roosevelt of the Unite States and Winston S. Churchill, British Prime Minister. And their commanders: General George C. Marshall, U.S. Army Chief of staff and Alan Brooke, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff. "Masters and Commanders" is the story of how these four truly remarkable men came together to shape the strategy that ultimately defeated the Germans in Western Europe. Contrary to the impression the publicists fostered, the relationship was not smooth. Roosevelt and Churchill, despite their natural personal liking for each other, schemed to get their own way. Marshall and Brooke maintained a correct working relationship, but frequently clashed. This history provides more detail on the often contentious relationships than any other, due largely to the uncovering of several personal diaries which heretofore were not available. The very detail of this history is also its undoing: while Andrew Roberts is a competent writer, his style is conducive to slow and occasionally difficult reading. There is so much detail that it is wearing and, much of it could have been edited out without harming the book. For those who can deal with it, the rewards are rich - an unparalleled look at how these four titans, as they are accurately described, ran the war on a day to day basis and hammered out the strategies that would ultimately prevail. But as every history buff knows, it was not a smooth process and some of the strategies did not bring success. It is surprising, in fact, that this quartet survived the rigors of the war. (Roosevelt, of course, died in April, 1945, before the end of the war. It is an eternal disappointment to the student of history that he kept no diary or other independent record of his thoughts.) Part of the reason for the tediousness of this book is that it is a record of the often tedious work of staffs. It was they who put together the plans that allowed the field commanders, like Eisenhower, to reap the publicity as the conquerors in the field. But it was Marshall and Brooke who decided where the overall strategy, with the approval and often the interference of Roosevelt and Churchill. While Marshall went on to enhance his fame as U.S. Secretary of State, Alan Brooke is little remembered: the fate of the staff officer. Yet these two men together with Roosevelt and Churchill authored the plan that saved Western democracy. In the early years of the war, that was far from a certain outcome. Overall, for the very serious student of World War II, this is an invaluable contribution and essential reading. But be prepared to spend a great deal of time plowing through it. Jerry

I think the reviewer who complained about the price has a point. My solution was to read the Kindle sample which I loved and buy the hardcover at Amazon

This is one of the most enjoyable reads on history that I've had in years. As a veteran of many bureaucratic wars, it's wonderful to behold a book which exposes that even in the midst of total war in which everyone is doing his or her best to do the right things that humanity cannot be turned off. In popular history, Churchill, Roosevelt, Marshall and Brooke moved with brilliance and coordination to smite those nasty Nazis. As a long time reader of books by Churchill and other popular fantasies on how theses titans stood shoulder to shoulder and supported each other through thick and thin and how they delegated to brilliant and intrepid subordinates and behold freedom triumphed over evil; what a great fairy tale, so thanks for this little gem. It's refreshing to see from their own words that these giants at times could be back biting nasty men capable of the most juvenile behavior possible even as their world faced its gravest test. But despite their failings, they hung together as best they could and defeated an enemy truly inspired by evil. As Roberts points out Brooke and Marshall are suffering the fate of most top strategists and are fading in history while their masters and the battle commanders shine even more brightly with passing of decades. Marshall, one of my long time heroes, gets the best marks from the author, although he's clearly far from perfect. Brooke, whom I barely knew from history and personal remembrance, is considered the brains of the quartet, but he was often a mean spirited back biter. Churchill who looms so large in our minds and hearts is brought down a peg or two as a bully and b.s. artist. Roosevelt, of course, escapes Roberts as he does all historians, and it is only grudgingly near the end of the book that he is given credit for being the eight hundred pound gorilla and most important western leader. Roberts tries to hide his bias for the British side, but when all the Americans who say nasty things about their UK counterparts are Anglophobes while those on the other side who criticize unfairly are merely good boys under great stress this Yank felt that we got the short end. And his well mounted arguments that the Brits were truly champions of the Normandy invasion don't quite cut it. In the end, it doesn't matter that Roberts failed to make his case concerning this four man merry-go- round, and he more than made up for this minor deficiency with wonderful insights into the personalities of these great men. As in any bureaucratic struggle, these four giants constantly cast about among themselves and elsewhere to gain support for their ever shifting positions. It was a wonderful thought and this is a wonderful read; I highly recommend it.

This is a wonderful book covering the interpersonal dynamics at the highest levels of command betwen the British and Americans in World War II. It is NOT for the casual reader, except that many of Roberts' presentations should become common knowledge among all those interested in World War II. The author in an Englishman, and the book is written in British English. He must be commended for his even-handedness as I could detect in only a very few places a slight pro-British bias. An example would be in his discussion of Dragoon (which the author felt was unnecessary) that the effort should have been made in the Scheldt estuary to open up Antwerp, but then he fails to mention that the Scheldt could have been opened immediately after Antwerp was captured and that it wasn't was strictly due to Montgomery's negligence. There are other small items missing (can't cover everything in only 585 pages) such as why the British were on the left flank in Normandy (that was then used as the reason why the British would gain control over Northern Germany.) The planner who put Montgomery on the left flank was General Frederick Morgan, the British General in charge of the planning for the cross-Channel invasion while Eisenhower and the armies were slaving away in the Mediterranean. That being said, there is so much good here I don't know where to begin. The problems in running the Allied show were immense and almost every other book on World War II simply skates over the very real problems between the British and Americans as if we were always one big happy family. The truth is that Churchill often subordinated military reality to political fantasies, Roosevelt was a mediocre intellect who was influenced by cronies who were very pro-Soviet (and even Soviet agents,) Brooke was a general who had never won a battle but felt he knew everything and that Americans were all idiots, and Marshall (like Eisenhower) had never commanded troops in battle. That they struggled through to victory seems like a miracle. How that came about is the subject of this book. In short, the American plan was to build up their forces as rapidly as possible and strike across the Channel into France at the earliest opportunity. Marshall and Roosevelt felt the shortest path to victory lay through France to Germany with the Soviets coming from the East through Russia and Poland into Germany. The British had known only defeat by the Germans until October, 1942, and wanted to nibble around the edges of the Germany conquests until the German Army lost much of its combat effectiveness. This approached was supported by all the post-war analyses of effectiveness that have shown that the German soldier was clearly better than his Soviet, British or American counterpart by as much as fifty percent. Brooke, in particular, seemed to overrate the Germans to the point where it eliminated aggressiveness on his part (but only toward the Germans -- he retained it toward the Americans.) The British talked the Americans into Torch, the invasion of North Africa, against Marshall's better judgment (even to the end of the war.) The conference at Casablanca was seen by the Americans as a British victory, one which they would not allow again. In a very large sense, Churchill and Brooke overplayed their hand as experts among innocents, and after obtaining American agreement for Husky and the subsequent invasion of Italy (and the mission creep up the Italian peninsula), the Americans hardened and paid the British back with interest. Churchill's much-loved diversions like Norway, the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean were simply discarded out of hand by Marshall and Roosevelt when they came up. Eventually, of cource, the United States carried the lion's share of the fighting and as early as the summer of 1944, Great Britain could no longer supply replacements to maintain its fighting strength. Brooke's many battles to delay Overlord and divert troops into areas to serve British imperial interests ultimately came to grief. After the spring of 1944, the American planners were totally dominant, and British influence on strategy became minimal. In retrospect it seems incredible that Brooke expected to be named Supreme Commander in Europe when ultimately two-thirds of the forces would be American. There are many interesting side elements in this work such as the British using large numbers of Canadian troops, resources and financial support without giving the Canadians a seat at the planning and control table. In fact, the British spoke for all the Dominion forces, Australian, Indian, South African and New Zealanders without sharing power while usually including them in tabulations of British strenght. And when a Dominion government went against the British as did the Australians in calling for their two divisions to be returned from the Middle East to defend Australia, Churchill became angry beyond control. It was no small wonder that the American planners felt that the British were just using everyone else to defend or regain their empire. Americans would do everything they could to defend England but not British interests throughout the world. Oh gosh, I could go on and on like this for many pages -- there are so many issues fully discussed in this work. The subjects come alive through their diaries and post-war writings, much of which the author quotes with the comment that they were unfair, misleading or untrue. Yes, both sides lied to each other, sometimes angrily and with great passion. Unfortunately, Roosevelt generally refused to have notes taken at his meetings and then never got the chance to present his side in print. Nonetheless, the author has managed cover Roosevelt's input and decisions very well. In conclusion, this is an extremely valuable work and destined to become a classic on World War II. I recommend this work without reservation and commend the author for his fine writing and scholarship. We are all the better for his work.

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